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This paper studies the implications of cross-border nancial integration
for nancial stability when banks' loan portfolios adjust endogenously. Banks
can be subject to sectoral and aggregate domestic shocks. After integration
they can share these risks in a complete interbank market. When banks have
a comparative advantage in providing credit to certain industries, nancial
integration may induce banks to specialize in lending. An enhanced concen-
tration in lending does not necessarily increase risk, because a well-functioning
interbank market allows to achieve the necessary diversication. This greater
need for risk sharing, though, increases the risk of cross-border contagion and
the likelihood of widespread banking crises. However, even though integration
increases the risk of contagion it improves welfare if it permits banks to realize
specialization benets.
Keywords: Financial integration, specialization, interbank market, nancial
contagion
JEL Classication: D61, E44, G21
1Non technical summary 
A key question for Europe and the world after several years of crisis is whether the 
process of financial integration should continue or whether slowing it down may bring 
advantages in terms of greater financial stability. One significant benefit of financial 
integration is that it generally improves risk sharing across borders. It reduces the 
impact of regional shocks on domestic consumption. Greater diversification through 
financial markets at the same time also allows realising specialisation benefits at the 
regional or firm level. When diversification of sectoral risks can be achieved through 
integrated financial markets, regions or firms can focus on those technologies in which 
they have a comparative advantage. 
Financial globalisation of the recent decades has been driven to a significant extent by a 
greater integration of interbank markets. But interbank integration not only provides 
greater scope for risk sharing. It also brings about the risk of cross-border financial 
contagion. If a regional shock exceeds the risk bearing capacities of a regional bank, it 
fails and cannot honour its commitments. This can lead to failures of banks abroad, 
which have lent money to it, are suspected by others to have done so (asymmetric 
information) or because of a general dry-up of liquidity. Thus from a welfare 
perspective financial integration is only beneficial if the expected benefits from greater 
risk-sharing exceed the expected costs from cross-border financial contagion. In this 
paper we develop a theoretical model to study this trade-off, paying particular attention 
to the role of specialisation. 
In the model we take into account that the access to an integrated interbank market leads 
to greater specialisation in banks’ loan portfolio and thereby increases endogenously 
both the benefits from risk sharing and the costs from financial contagion. Banks can 
lend to different industries, which are subject to productivity shocks that can delay 
repayments. If the interbank market is not integrated, banks have to cushion such 
sectoral shocks through diversification of their loan books. They cannot share the risk of 
delayed loan repayments with banks abroad. Thus, it is not optimal for banks to fully 
exploit the greater returns from specialisation in the industry in which they have a 
comparative advantage, because the greater concentration in lending would expose them 
too much to sectoral shocks. If there is an integrated and well functioning interbank 
market available, liquidity shocks can be diversified relatively independently from the 
2 
lending decision of banks. It is then profitable for them to increase their investment in 
the high-return industry, as the greater idiosyncratic exposure to sectoral shocks can be 
shared with banks abroad. So, specialisation in lending to different sectors increases 
both idiosyncratic liquidity risks of banks and their benefits from risk sharing, which 
arise endogenously. 
At the same time, however, specialisation makes banks more reliant on the liquidity 
available on the interbank market. When a specialised bank is hit by a sectoral shock it 
is dependent on payments from the bank in the other country. If this other bank is hit by 
a country-specific shock itself (or, for example, has some operational problems), so that 
it is not in a position to make those payments, both banks will ultimately default. The 
first bank fails as a consequence of not receiving the expected payments, which is a 
form of cross-border bank contagion. In this sense integration and specialisation 
endogenously increase contagion risk. 
Moving from a situation without an interbank market to one with an integrated market, 
the effects of loan shocks and contagion risk on bank default risk offset each other. In 
fact, assuming that country-specific (or operational) shocks are equally likely in all 
countries and that they are uncorrelated with sectoral shocks, one can show that overall 
bank default risk remains unchanged. Banks realise, however, the greater returns from 
enhanced specialisation, so that overall welfare increases through integration in the 
model. 
Of course, these results are derived under specific assumptions. In particular, the model 
is a fundamental research contribution to an as yet little developed literature on the 
relationship between financial integration and stability. At this stage it does not consider 
the implications of financial regulation and supervision, deposit insurance or central 
banks acting as lender of last resort. It also abstracts from the possibility that 
widespread banking crises may have overproportionally negative effects on the real 
economy compared to single bank failures. Keeping these limitations in mind, at least 
two lessons for policy may be learnt. Financial integration should not simply be resisted 
on stability grounds. Even though it enhances cross-border contagion risks in times of 
stress, better risk sharing has also offsetting stability effects and allows for exploiting 
further benefits from specialisation, potentially leading to an on average higher level of 
economic welfare. Nevertheless, the emergence of cross-border contagion risk with 
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financial integration points to the need for adjusting supervisory approaches and 
structures to the geographical scope of banking activities. For example, improved 
supervisory structures and governance mechanisms at the level of the European Union, 
including the European Systemic Risk Board and the European Supervisory Agencies 
for banking, insurance and securities markets, have the potential to significantly 
strengthen the benefits of the single market for financial services. 
 
41 Introduction
Large and complex nancial institutions increasingly dominate the nancial sys-
tems of industrial countries. Partly to further enhance scale, partly for domestic
competition policy and partly for diversifying revenue streams and risks, these -
nancial institutions transact more and more across borders. They link the nancial
systems of dierent countries and foster international nancial integration. By di-
versifying their risks more they improve the resilience of the international nancial
system against idiosyncratic shocks. At the same time, however, the risk of nan-
cial contagion is extended from the national level to the international arena. Due to
international integration a default of one such institution can now have more severe
negative externalities on nancial intermediaries abroad. As the recent turbulence
in the global nancial system following the failure of Lehman Brothers in Septem-
ber 2008 vividly showed, these externalities may arise from direct exposures, from
asymmetric information about them or from large failures causing liquidity dry-ups
in key markets.1 The increasing cross-border activities and risk exposures of ma-
jor nancial intermediaries are particularly challenging, as the main regulatory and
supervisory setups in banking, securities and insurance business remain predomi-
nantly at the national level, and therefore may not be able to eectively address
cross-border contagion risk.
Theoretical studies that deal with this trade-o between the benets from diver-
sication and the expected costs from nancial contagion focus on the integration
through the interbank market, because banks remain at the core of nancial sys-
tems and tend to be particularly linked among each other. For a number of reasons
(large and complex nancial conglomerates, trading links between dierent types of
nancial institutions, e.g., through new credit risk transfer markets, or banks' prime
1An early case of international nancial contagion due to direct exposures was the Herstatt
crisis in 1974. A more recent example of international systemic risk related to market illiquidities
was the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis in 1998. For a discussion of these and
many other cases, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004).
5broker activities for hedge funds), however, the analysis carries over to other large
nancial intermediaries. Moreover, the one and a half decades prior to the recent
nancial crisis have witnessed exponential growth of cross-border bank activities
(see gure 1). The overwhelming part of this is constituted of interbank assets and
liabilities.
Previous studies of the welfare implications of integrated interbank markets,
however, took the corporate lending behavior of banks as given. This implies that
the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks across regions is not aected by nancial
integration.2 This assumption is problematic because one should expect that the
portfolios of nancial institutions react to the openness of nancial markets. In
order to fully evaluate the allocative eects of nancial integration one needs to
endogenize the loan portfolios of domestic or international banks.
In this paper we follow this idea. We analyze the welfare eects of nancial
integration taking into account that the improved scope for risk sharing through
integrated nancial markets aects banks' specialization which in turn inuences
the cross-country distribution of bank specic shocks. More precisely, we develop a
model in which each local bank has a comparative advantage in lending to a specic
sector, because this sector is most productive in the respective bank's country.3
2While Allen and Gale (2004a,b) and Fecht (2004) focus on interrelations between banks through
the general asset market, Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000), Fecht and
Gr uner (2006), as well as Fecht, Gr uner, and Hartmann (2007) focus on the interbank deposit
market. All of these studies assume a given distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks.
In contrast, two papers analyze the impact of interbank markets on banks' investment choices,
focusing on moral hazard problems and the incentives for peer monitoring. Rochet and Tirole
(1996) assess the incentives for peer monitoring in order to draw conclusions about the scope for a
system-wide banking crisis in this context. Freixas and Holthausen (2004) discuss the implications
of greater asymmetric information about foreign compared to domestic banks for the structure and
integration of an interbank market. None of these two papers, however, focus on the relationship
between interbank market integration and cross-border contagion.
3See Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006) for empirical evidence of these specialization benets
in banking.
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Panel (a) reports the development of 1) banks' cross-border asset and liability holdings, 2) cross-border interbank
assets and liabilities, and 3) cross-border interbank debt positions according to an index constructed based on the
BIS Locational Banking Statistics, whereby cross-border asset liabilities held in 2000Q1 are set to 100.
Panel (b) reports 1) banks' cross-border assets and liabilities according to the BIS Locational Banking Statistics
relative to the sum of foreign assets and liabilities following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), 2) the share of cross-
border interbank assets and liabilities in cross-border assets and liabilities of banks according to the BIS Locational
Banking Statistics, and 3) the share of cross-border interbank debt claims in cross-border interbank assets and
liabilities according to the BIS Locational Banking Statistics.
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics predominatingly covers OECD countries' banking sectors.
Source: BIS "Locational banking statistics", http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm.
7Since the timing of loan repayments is uncertain across sectors a trade-o between
specialization in lending and diversifying liquidity risks arises.
Integration through an interbank market allows banks to reallocate funds across
borders and share their liquidity risks. As the scope for diversication through an
interbank market improves, banks may choose to increase their lending to the most
protable sector in their region, because the need to diversify through their loan
portfolio diminishes. This endogenously raises banks' exposure to specic sectoral
shocks and further increases the need for diversication through the interbank mar-
ket. Thus, the more pronounced is the specialization in the loan book the greater is
the need for risk sharing and the more reliant are regional nancial institutions on
a well-functioning integrated interbank market. But if banks rely to a larger extent
on the interbank market to buer liquidity shocks the risk of contagion grows. If
the sector in which one bank is specialized suers from an adverse liquidity shock,
this bank might not be able to raise the needed liquidity in the integrated interbank
market, if the foreign bank is at the same time hit by a domestic shock, for instance,
due to an operational problem. In that way the failure of one bank as a consequence
of a severe domestic shock is transmitted over an integrated interbank market to
banks across borders and might ultimately destabilize banks that were initially not
aected by the shock.4
These results match very well recent empirical evidence by Bonglioli (2008) on
the role of nancial integration for national productivity. According to her analysis,
nancial integration raises total factor productivity. Moreover, she nds that nan-
cial integration slightly raises the risk of nancial contagion. Both observations are
in line with the present theory.
We also analyze how nancial integration aects overall nancial stability and
welfare. If banks already reap the benets of specialization without the risk sharing
opportunities of an integrated interbank market, then nancial integration does not
4It is interesting to note that this channel of interbank contagion is not based on the loss of
interbank deposits as in Allen and Gale (2000) or Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000).
8change the portfolio composition and bank specic liquidity shocks. However, an
interbank market allows banks to pool these risks and might thus be welfare en-
hancing. If it is only nancial integration that induces banks to specialize in their
lending portfolio then the severity of idiosyncratic risk exposure increases. But the
enhanced risk sharing through the interbank market compensates this. However, it
also makes banks dependent on the liquidity provision from the cross-border bank-
ing market. This channel for cross-border contagion further enhances banks' default
risk. However, in our model the higher systemic risk is exactly oset by the lower
exposure to domestic shocks. Thus while individual banks' default probability re-
mains unaected, the risk of a joint banking crisis increases. As long as wide-spread
banking crises are not more costly than national banking crises the economic welfare
overall improves because of the benets from specialization. In sum, the changes
that nancial integration might induce on banks lending behavior have important
implications for the relationship between integration and stability and for welfare.
There is a developing, primarily empirical literature about the benets and costs
of nancial globalization and capital account liberalization. One part of this lit-
erature suggests that countries with sound macroeconomic policies, good economic
institutions, advanced nancial development and openness as well as good human
capital (i.e. industrial countries and, perhaps, a few advanced emerging market
countries) are able to reap the risk sharing benets of international nancial inte-
gration, whereas countries that are below certain levels for these variables (i.e. most
developing and emerging market countries) are not able to benet.5 The small part
5See, for example, the two recent surveys by Henry (2006) and Kose, Prasad, Rogo, and
Wei (2009). Stulz (2005) discusses the agency problems that hinder less developed countries from
reaping the benets of nancial integration. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001, 2005 and 2006)
and Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2006) nd even more generally valid positive eects of
equity market liberalizations. Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) estimate that banking integration
through the removal of branching restrictions in the United States reduced and aligned state-level
business cycles, as measured by gross state product, employment and personal income growth.
Matsuyama (2007) presents a broad theoretical framework.
9of this literature most closely related to our work asks how nancial openness or the
presence of capital controls aects the likelihood of nancial crises. Despite concerns
sometimes raised in policy circles, there does not seem to be systematic evidence
suggesting that greater nancial integration increases the likelihood of crises, quite
the contrary.6 Still, particularly in developing countries weak nancial supervision,
contract enforcement problems and unsound macroeconomic policies may sometimes
adversely interact with too fast nancial liberalization and thereby contribute to -
nancial instability.7 There is also some evidence that cross-border contagion risks
among industrial countries are increasing in conjunction with the nancial integra-
tion process.8 Hence, also the available empirical research suggests that the welfare
analysis of international nancial integration needs to consider both eciency and
stability implications.9
The relationship between eciency and stability implications of nancial inte-
gration emphasized in our paper is strongly related to the one put forward in Allen
and Gale (2000) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000). They also show that nan-
6Controlling for selection bias, Glick, Guo, and Hutchison (2006) estimate that countries with
fewer restrictions on capital ows experience a smaller probability of currency crises than coun-
tries that restrict capital ows more. Bonglioli and Mendicino (2004) nd that the frequency of
banking crises is about the same in countries with capital controls and restrictions on equity trans-
actions as it is in countries without such controls and restrictions. Moreover, the adverse eects of
banking crises on economic growth turn out to be less severe in countries with less restricted capital
accounts. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) nd that nancial liberalizations increase the
likelihood of banking crises, but they only consider domestic interest rate liberalizations and they
do not look at the removal of restrictions on foreign capital. See Ferguson, Hartmann, Panetta,
and Portes (2007) for a review and similar results from estimations using de facto measures of
integration rather than de jure measures of capital controls.
7See for example Eichengreen, Mussa, DellArriccia, Detragiache, Milesi-Ferretti, and Tweedie
(1998), Williamson and Mahar (1998) or Ishii and Habermeier (2002) for broad overviews and
policy discussions.
8See Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2006), Degryse and Nguyen (2007) and van Lelyveld
and Liedorp (2006).
9See also Tirole (2002) and Eichengreen (2003).
10cial integration through the interbank market allows to diversify regional liquidity
shocks eciently while entailing the risk of nancial contagion between banks from
dierent regions. But they do not allow for the important endogenous response of
bank balance sheets, in particular specialization in lending. Moreover, while in their
model liquidity shocks result from stochastic withdrawals of depositors, in our model
liquidity shocks stem from uncertainty in the timing of loan repayments (similar to
the assumptions underlying Diamond and Rajan (2005)). Non-performing loans are
often not defaulting loans but are repaid later than expected, thereby constitut-
ing an important liquidity risk. Furthermore, while in Allen and Gale (2000) and
Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) it is the larger credit exposure that leads to cross
regional contagion among banks, in our paper it is the greater dependency on liq-
uidity from the interbank market that makes banks more susceptible to contagious
market dry-ups.
Our paper is also related to a literature on the relative benets of bank diver-
sication. Hanson, Pesaran, and Schuermann (2005) suggest that the scope for
the international diversication of credit risk is substantial. Winton (1999), how-
ever, warns on theoretical grounds that reduced incentives for monitoring borrowers
may oset prima facie asset diversication benets. DeLong (2001) nds that the
announcement eects of bank mergers that are focused in both activity and geogra-
phy suggest more creation of stockholder value than other types of mergers. These
results are also consistent with our result that greater specialization through cross-
border integration and diversication through the interbank market may be welfare
improving.
Last, the paper is related to an earlier debate about optimum currency areas.
In this debate it was a widely held argument that the criteria of what constitutes
an optimum currency area is endogenous. According to the main proponents of
that view{Frankel and Rose (1998){the deeper economic integration that goes along
with a greater monetary integration aects the correlation of business cycles across
member countries which in turn aects the costs of a common monetary policy. One
11important eect that these authors stress is that by reducing obstacles to interna-
tional trade a monetary union 1) enables countries to capture benets from com-
parative advantages whether they are due to technological dierences, dierences
in factor endowments or whether they result from economies of scale, 2) fosters
national specialization and 3) ultimately leads to less correlated business cycles.
Similarly, in a recent study Heathcote and Perri (2004) showed that in the course
of nancial globalization the correlation of the U.S. business cycle with the rest of
the world has declined. However, they argue that nancial globalization ampli-
ed an exogenous reduction in the correlation of productivity shocks by enlarging
cross-border capital ows. More related to our view, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and
Yosha (2003) provide evidence that indeed a deeper integration of international as-
set markets improves cross-regional risk sharing and leads to greater specialization
in production, as rst supposed by Helpman and Razin (1978).
2 Assumptions
Consider a three period economy t = 0;1;2 consisting of regions j 2 fA;Bg. In
each region there is a continuum of households with the same utility function:
U (c1;c2) = c1 + c2.
Thus households are assumed to be risk-neutral.
In t = 1 a fraction q > 1=2 of households receives the blueprint of a production
technology which produces a return X > 1 in t = 2. This investment opportunity
is not publicly observable and is only available to the respective household.10
10Introducing this private investment opportunity we basically have a linearized version of the
Diamond/Dybvig utility function (see Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). Impatient household are
those with a private investment opportunity. They have a higher pay-o from goods available in
t = 1 while patient households, i.e. those with no private investment opportunity, are indierent
between consumption goods in t = 1 and t = 2. Note that because of this linear pay-o function
welfare considerations dier from standard Diamond/Dybvig based models because the marginal
12Apart from a storage technology that allows to transfer funds from one period to
the next without paying any interest, there are two investment technologies available,
that dier in their regional return. Technology S produces a region specic return
Sj for each unit invested in t = 0 and technology R produces a return Rj, with
X > Rj;Sj > 1. We assume that region A has an advantage in technology S while
region B has the same advantage in using technology R:
SB = RA < RB = SA
These regional advantages in the return from the two investment technology can be
explained, for instance, by dierences in the resources available in the two regions.
A liquidity risk for banks and thus a reason to invest in the storage technology
emerges in our model because the timing of the cash-ow realized from investments
in technology S and R is uncertain. With probability e sector R is hit by a shock and
the investments in this technology cannot be realized before t = 2 while the returns
from technology S are realized in t = 1. With the same probability a sectoral shock
hits sector S and technology S produces late while technology R is early.11 When
liquidated before maturity the return of both technologies is   0.
In addition to sectoral shocks, with probability f a regional shock hits either
region and both technologies in the respective region produce late, while only one
technology is late in the other region. We assume that the probability for such
a regional shock is close to zero. For simplicity we x the probability that both
technologies produce an early return at zero.12 The joint probability distribution of
utility of impatient households is not decreasing.
11Note that our assumptions ensure for simplicity that banks can fully diversify sectoral liquidity
shocks. With a portfolio that fully diversies these shocks the cash-ows generated in t = 1 and
in t = 2 are identical. To ensure that banks still have an incentive to hold liquidity we need to
assume q > 1=2. Alternatively we could also assume that part of the returns on technology S and
R is always late, i.e. only realized in t = 2. This would clearly not aect our results but make the
notation messier.
12A positive probability of early returns in both sectors would not aect any of our results unless
this probability is too large.
13the cash ows (C1;C2) in t = 1 and t = 2 of the two technologies in the two regions
is summarized in the following table.
Region A
(RA;SA) (SA;RA) (0;SA + RA)
(RB;SB) e 0 f
Region B (SB;RB) 0 e f
(0;SB + RB) f f 0
Obviously,
2e + 4f = 1.
Households cannot invest directly in those technologies. They can only invest
their funds with their local bank. Banks can only raise funds from households in
their respective region and they can only invest in the two technologies in their home
region. Cross-border retail business and cross-border lending is not feasible. We also
assume that there is only one bank operating in each region. But we assume that
the regional banking market is a contestable market. Thus banks are forced to oer
to households the deposit contract that maximizes their t = 0-expected utility.13 A
deposit contract promises a repayment d1 to all depositors that withdraw in t = 1.
The banks' cash-ow in t = 1 is not veriable and thus not contractible. Deposit
contracts with a repayment d1 contingent on the cash-ow realized in t = 1 are not
feasible. However, depositors can observe the banks' t = 1 cash-ow. Consequently,
if the remaining assets after repaying d1 to impatient depositors are more than
sucient to repay the patient depositors d2 = d1 in t = 2 then the bank's remaining
funds are distributed to the patient depositors in t = 2. If the bank's assets are
insucient to repay the impatient depositors d1 and patient ones d2  d1 in t = 2,
late depositors run to be rst in line to withdraw in t = 1.14 We assume that patient
13Following the reasoning of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) it is easy to see that also in our
environment a deposit contract is an optimal contractual arrangement insuring households against
the risk of being impatient given that these shocks are unobservable.
14Here we simply assume that banks can only use deposit contracts that do not allow for a
14and impatient depositors have the same chance of getting a certain position in the
line.
In sum, the timing of the model is as follows:
t=0: Banks oer fd1;d2g.
Households invest in deposits at local bank.
Banks invest in liquidity and in technologies S and R.
t=1: Households receive private investment opportunity.
Households observe liquidity available to their bank.
If a bank has sucient funds to pay its impatient HH d1 and patient HH d2,
then only impatient depositors withdraw and bank repays
If a bank has insucient funds to repay d1 and d2,
then depositors run and bank is liquidated and
liquidation proceeds repaid on rst come rst served basis.
t=2: Cash ow from late projects realized.
Banks pay d2 on not yet withdrawn deposits from households.
3 Optimal allocation with separate banks
In this section we study the optimal allocation given that banks do not dispose of
any means to share risks across regions.
3.1 Diversied banks
First, we analyze the optimal investment portfolio and deposit contract of a bank
that runs the risk of becoming illiquid if its is hit by a regional shocks, but that
plans to honor the deposit contract in any other case. Without loss of generality we
focus on a bank operating in region A.
suspension of convertibility. However, it is straightforward that a commitment problem of the
bank manager  a la Diamond and Rajan (2001) could be easily integrated in this setting and
would endogenously derive a deposit contract including a sequential service constraint without a
suspension of convertibility as the optimal contractual arrangement.
15Dene l0 as the fraction invested in t = 0 in liquidity holdings, k = 1   l0 as
the fraction invested into the two production technologies, and xA the fraction of k
invested in the inferior production technology R.
Unless it is hit by a regional shock bank A can realize from each unit k of capital
investment a minimum t1-cash-ow given by
1 = Min[RAxA;SA (1   xA)]: (1)
Given that bank A disregards the risks of a regional shock, the expression 1kA
gives the liquidity inow from investments in the production technologies that the
bank can rely on in t = 1 when deciding about the optimal short-term repayment on
the deposit contract. Any additional liquidity inow is only available in certain fa-
vorable states. It is not available with certainty to renance short-term repayments.
Thus if the bank wants to avoid ending up in a liquidity crisis due to sectoral shocks
it will not rely on those additional funds for the anticipated short-term withdrawals.
Instead it will store this extra liquidity for additional long-term repayments of de-
posits. Thus returns from production technologies available to renance d2 are given
by 2kA with
2 = Max[RAxA;SA (1   xA)]: (2)
Consequently, a safe optimal deposit contract that an autarkic bank can always
meet except if it is hit by a regional liquidity shock solves (P1).
(P1)
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
max
d1;d2;l0
2f (qX + (1   q))l0 + (2e + 2f)(qXd1 + (1   q)d2)
s.t. qd1 = 1 (1   l0) + l0 (BC1)
(1   q)d2 = 2 (1   l0) (BC2)
d1  d2 (IC)
The bank maximizes depositors' expected utility whereby it runs the risk that
with probability 2f it will be hit by a regional shock. In that case the bank antici-
pates to have insucient cash in t = 1 to repay d1 to impatient depositors. Thus it
expects to be liquidated in which case it will be only able to repay on average the
16per capita liquidity holding l0 to its depositors. Since in a run patient and impatient
households have the same chance of receiving a repayment on their deposits the ex-
pected utility from receiving a unit repaid in that state is given by qX   (1   q).
In those states in which there is only a sectoral shock (happening with probability
2e) or in which the other region is hit be a regional shock (probability 2f) the bank
plans to repay the promised amount d1 to impatient and d2 to patient depositors.
Impatient depositors can use the proceeds received in t = 1 to apply their private
technology generating a return X > 1 in t = 2 on each unit invested, while patient
depositors consume the repayment d2 in t = 2.
The budget constraint (BC1) ensures that the funds supposed to be repaid to
impatient depositors do not exceed the liquidity holding plus the t1-cash-ow from
capital investment that is realized given no regional shock in region A. (BC2) pro-
vides that the cash-ow available in t = 2 from late investment projects is sucient
to repay patient depositors. The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) ensures
that patient depositors do not have an incentive to withdraw early and consume the
proceeds immediately.
Since X > 1 the bank maximizes depositors' expected utility by increasing as
much as possible the short-term repayment on deposits. Thus for the optimal deposit
contract (IC) holds with equality. Taking that into account it follows from (BC1)
and (BC2) that
(1   q)1 (1   l0) + (1   q)l0 = q2 (1   l0):




q2   (1   q)1
q2   (1   q)1 + (1   q)
:
Reinserting in (BC1) and (BC2) yields
dD = d1 = d2 =
2
q2   (1   q)1 + (1   q)
: (3)
From (1), (2), and (3) it is easy to see that for xA > SA=(RA + SA)
17dD =
RAxA





 (1   q)(SA   1)RA
(qRAxA   (1   q)SA (1   xA) + (1   q))
2 < 0:
It is also easy to see from (1), (2), and (3) that for xA < SA=(RA + SA)
dD =
SA (1   xA)






(RA   1)SA (1   q)
qSA (1   xA)   (1   q)RAxA + (1   q)
> 0:
So obviously dD is maximized for ^ xA = SA=(RA + SA). For xA = ^ xA the bank fully
diversies sectoral liquidity shocks and receives the same deterministic cash ow 
in t = 1 and t = 2 given no regional shocks in region A:




Thus investing in the portfolio (l





(2q   1) + (1   q) 1





(2q   1) + (1   q) 1
Since @=@(SA=RA) < 0, it is easy to see that increasing benets from special-







Note that ^ xA > 1=2. Thus a portfolio with fully diversied sectoral cash ow
shocks implies that bank A has to invest a larger fraction of its capital in the inferior
technology RA in order to maximize the minimum period 1 return. Obviously, the
bigger the benets from specialization, i.e. the bigger SA=RA, the smaller is this
cash ow of a portfolio that fully diversies sectoral shocks.
18Lemma 1 The optimal deposit contract of a bank that wants to avoid a liquidity
shortage in all but those states in which it suers from a regional shock is charac-
terized by d1 = d2 = d
D. The repayments on this optimal deposit contract decline
with increasing benets from specialization.
Given this maximum repayment that the bank can promise in t = 1 the expected
utility of households in the respective regions is
EU
D = 2f (qX + (1   q))l

0 + (2e + 2f)(qX + (1   q))d

D (4)
It is easy to see that bank B will oer the same deposit contract and will hold the
same amount of liquidity as bank A. The only dierence is that bank B will invest
more of its capital into technology S: ^ xB = 1   ^ xA. Thus following this diversied
strategy both banks are forced to invest the larger fraction of their capital into the
technology in which they have a disadvantage.
3.2 Undiversied banks
Assume now that bank A follows a more risky strategy and oers a deposit contract
that it can only honor if the regionally more productive technology S generates the
cash-ow already in t = 1. This means that the bank anticipates to be liquidated
not only if a regional shock hits region A but also if technology S is aected by a
sectoral shock. Since the liquidation value is zero for both production technologies
the portfolio decision xA does not matter for bankruptcy returns. The portfolio
decision only aects the repayment on deposits in those states in which technology
S produces early returns. Since the bank can always shift resources between t = 1
and t = 2 using the storage technology it is obviously optimal for the bank to invest





> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
max
d1;d2;l0
(e + 3f)(qX + (1   q))l0 + (e + f)(qXd1 + (1   q)d2)
s.t. qd1 = SA (1   l1)(1   l0) + l0 (BC1)
(1   q)d2 = SAl1 (1   l0) (BC2)
d1  d2 (IC)
The optimal deposit contract maximizes depositors expected utility given that
it can only repay the liquidation value l0 if sector S is hit by a sectoral shock (which
happens with probability e + f) or region A is aected by a regional shock (which
happens with probability 2f). In the run that leads to the liquidation, patient and
impatient depositors have the same chance of receiving their repayment. Thus the
expected utility in this case is given by the weighted average of patient and impatient
depositors. Only if sector S generates an early cash-ow and region A is not hit
by a regional shock then the bank will provide the promised repayments d1 and d2
on deposits, whereby impatient depositors receiving d1 have a marginal benet of
X > 1 from repayments, while patient depositors who receive d2 have a marginal
utility of 1.
The budget constraint (BC1) in (P10) states that the repayments to impatient
depositors must not exceed the liquidity holdings l0 of bank A plus a fraction 1  
l1 of the cash-ow generated from the investment in technology S. l1 measures
the fraction of the cash-ow from capital investment that is not needed to repay
impatient depositors. It is stored in reserves for one period to renance the payment
to patient depositors. Thus (BC2) requires that this stored cash-ow is sucient for
the required repayments to the patient depositors. (IC) again ensures that patient
depositors do not withdraw in t = 1.
The bank maximizes depositors utility in those states in which it remains solvent,
by repaying as much as possible to impatient depositors. Thus (IC) will hold with
equality and it follows from (BC1) and (BC2) that
(1   q)SA (1   l1)(1   l0) + (1   q)l0 = qSAl1 (1   l0):
20Thus the optimal risky deposit contract is determined by
l1 = (1   q)
SA (1   l0) + l0
SA (1   l0)
and
dU = SA (1   l0) + l0.
This risky strategy provides depositors with an expected utility given by
EU





= [(e + 3f)   (e + f)(SA   1)](qX + (1   q)):
Consequently, the optimal risky strategy of an autarkic bank involves l0 = 0 if
2f   (e + f)(SA   2) < 0




Thus assuming that (6) holds15 then the expected utility that can be achieved
by the risky deposit contract d
U = SA is
EU
U = (e + f)(qX + (1   q))SA: (7)
3.3 Safe banks
Alternatively the bank could also oer a deposit contract that it could honor even
if it is hit by a regional shock. Obviously, in order to follow that strategy the bank
15Note that if (6) does not hold, then the bank would prefer to invest only in liquidity l0 = 1,
which implies d = 1 and would make the bank redundant. The expected utility in that case is
EUA = (2e + 4f)(qX + (1   q)):
21has to hold sucient liquidity to repay early withdrawals even if both technologies
provide a late return. But given that it holds sucient liquidity there is no need
for the bank to invest in a diversied portfolio. Thus following this strategy bank




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
max
d1;d2;l0
(2e + 4f)(qXd1 + (1   q)d2)
s.t. qd1 = l0 (BC1)
(1   q)d2 = SA (1   l0) (BC2)
d1  d2 (IC)
A safe bank will always ((2e + 4f) = 1) repay d1 and d2 to its impatient and
patient depositors, respectively, whereby again the impatient ones have a marginal
utility of X > 1 from each unit repaid, while patient depositors have only a marginal
utility of 1. To be able to always repay d1 the bank has to hold liquidity against
the early repayments, because only these funds are available with certainty in t = 1.
Thus (BC1) in (P100) ensures that the bank holds sucient liquidity to renance the
repayment to impatient depositors. Since the short-term repayments are always met
by the liquidity holdings the bank invests all the funds that are used to renance
the repayment to patient depositors in the most productive technology S. If this
technology is late it does not matter since the bank needs the funds only in t = 2
to repay the patient depositors. If the technology generates an early cash-ow the
bank will store the funds until t = 2. Obviously, any investment in technology R
would only reduce the possible payment to patient depositors. (IC) again ensures
that patient depositors keep their deposits until t = 2.










S = d1 = d2 =
SA
(1   q) + qSA
:
22The expected utility from such a deposit contract is
EU
S = (2e + 4f)(qX + (1   q))d

S:
3.4 Optimal deposit contract
Now we turn to the question under which parameter setting the dierent strategies
are optimal for the bank. First we focus on parameter settings in which banks choose
a diversied portfolio and oer d








Condition (8) requires that
(2e + 4qf)d

D > (e + f)SA
Reinserting the optimal deposit contract d
D we can derive for a given RA an upper
threshold  S for the returns of the more productive technology S in region A:
e(1 + q) + (5q   1)f
(e + f)

(2q   1) +
(1 q)
RA
 =:  S > SA: (10)
Thus as long as the returns on technology SA are lower than threshold  S bank
A prefers a diversied over a fully specialized portfolio. Intuitively, for a given
RA a higher return on technology SA increases specialization benets. In order to
ensure that full specialization is not preferable over diversication the benets from
specialization must not be too large.
We also need to ensure that (10) is consistent with our initial assumption, i.e.
 S > SA > RA > 1. Reinserting  S in this inequality allows us to derive a threshold
for RA:16
16See appendix for details. Note that  R > 1 for q  1=2.
232qe + (6q   2)f
(2q   1)(e + f)
=:  R > RA (11)
Hence, if this condition holds, there are values SA > RA > 1 such that
EUD > EUU.
Condition (9) holds if
(2e + 4qf)d






S allows us to derive for a given RA a lower threshold S for
the return of the more productive technology S in region A.
2f(1   q)2
[q (e + 2qf)   (e + 2f)(2q   1)]   (e + 2f)
(1 q)
RA
:= S < SA: (12)
As long as the returns on technology S in region A are higher than the threshold
a diversied bank is providing a higher expected utility to depositors than a safe
bank. Intuitively, since safe banks can avoid liquidation in case of regional liquidity
shocks the more likely regional liquidity shocks are (the higher f) the more prefer-
able are safe banks and the larger is the threshold in (12). Furthermore, the larger
the opportunity costs of holdings liquidity, i.e. the higher the returns on the two
investment opportunities R and S, the less preferable is the safe strategy. However,
because the few assets that a safe bank has are investments only in the more pro-
ductive technology S, larger benets from specialization, i.e. a lower RA for a given
SA in (12), make safe banks more preferable compared to diversied banks.
The deposit contract oered by a diversied bank is the optimal contract under
autarky if both conditions (12) and (10) are simultaneously satised. To see that
this can be the case consider the two thresholds  S and S at q = 1=2:





S(q = 1=2) =
fRA
(e + f)RA   (e + 2f)




24Since we know that for q ! 1=2 the upper threshold  R for RA goes to innity




conditions (12), (10), and the condition that SA > RA, can be simultaneously sat-
ised. Moreover, for q suciently close to 1=2 continuity of utilities in q guarantees
that the conditions can also be satised.
Thus we can summarize the ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For q suciently close to 1=2 conditions (12), (10), and SA > RA
can be simultaneously fullled and autarkic banks invest into a diversied portfolio
of technologies S and R. They invest the larger fraction into the inferior technology.
One can easily prove that there are parameters such that undiversied banks are
better than safe or diversied banks. They are better than safe banks if
EU
U > EU
S , SA > ^ S :=
2e + 4f
















e(1 + q) + (5q   1)f
(e + f)









undiversied banks are optimal.
4 Optimal allocation with integrated banks
In this section we rst derive the constraint ecient allocation and then show to
what extent this constraint ecient allocation can be implemented by an interbank
market.
254.1 The constrained ecient allocation
Consider the allocation that a social planner would implement given that he also
cannot observe whether a specic household has a private investment opportunity or
not. Thus we look for the ecient allocation under the constraint that it has to be
incentive compatible for patient households not to claim to be impatient. However,
the social planner can shift resources freely between regions. Thus he will obviously
not invest in technologies RA and SB; he will only make use of the most productive
technologies SA and RB, whereby SA = RB. Given that f is suciently low the
social planner will only diversify sector-specic shocks. Thus the constraint ecient
consumption allocation that a social planner will oer solves (P2):
(P2)
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
max
d1;d2;l0
2f (qXl0 + SA (1   l0)) + (2e + 2f)(qXd1 + (1   q)d2)
s.t. qd1 = SA (1   l0)=2 + l0 (BC1)
(1   q)d2 = SA (1   l0)=2 (BC2)
d1  d2 (IC)
Since it is optimal for the social planner to fully smooth sectoral cash-ow shocks,
he invests half of the capital investments 1  l0 in technology SA and the other half
in technology RB. (BC1) requires that in both regions the repayments to impatient
depositors do not exceed the liquidity held by the planner per region plus half of the
early cash-ow available in the economy. Given that sector S is early all cash-ow
generated in the economy is produced by technology S in region A and half of these
returns are transferred by the social planner to the other region. In contrast half of
the late produced cash-ow from technology R in region B is transferred to region
A to be paid to the patient household in this region. Given that SA = RB this
is reected in (BC2). In case of the opposite sectoral cash-ow shock the cross-
regional transfers are simply reversed. Since we are assuming that also the social
planner cannot observe households' idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (IC) has again to
be taken into account.
The social planner maximizes the expected utility of households in both regions.
26Thereby he has to take into account that he will only be able to repay the planned
amounts d1 and d2 if the region in which the sector is located that is supposed to
produce early returns is not hit by a regional shock. With probability 2e there
is no regional shock and with probability 2f there is only a regional shock in the
region with the production technology that is late anyway. Thus with probability
2e + 2f the planner can pay d1 and d2 to the impatient and patient households,
respectively. With probability 2f, however, the region A is hit by a regional shock
when technology S was producing early or region B has a shock when technology
R should be early. In these cases the social planner can only repay the liquidity
holdings to the impatient households, while he can divide the entire return on capital
investment SA (1   l0) by the 1   q patient households.17
Since f is assumed to be suciently small the planner maximizes also the short-
term repayment to impatient households d1 because it generates the maximum ex-
pected marginal utility. Thus (IC) holds again with equality at the optimal deposit
contract. As a consequence it follows from (BC1) and (BC2) that
qSA (1   l0) = (1   q)SA (1   l0) + (1   q)2l0:





2(1   q) + (2q   1)SA
;
and the optimal payment to patient and impatient households is
dI = d1 = d2 =
SA
2(1   q) + (2q   1)SA
:




0 . Consequently, the social planner improves households' welfare
compared to autarkic banks. He does not only avoid inecient liquidation but he
also fully reaps the benets of specialization.
17Thus we implicitly assume that the social planner is not forced to liquidate assets when he
cannot meet the planned payment to impatient depositors. We rather assume that he suspends
payments when liquidity is insucient.
274.2 Implementation through an interbank market
Now assume that there is an interbank market open in t = 1. In this interbank mar-
ket banks can trade liquidity against future cash-ow from some capital investment
at an equilibrium interest rate. Since there is no investment alternative to the stor-
age technology for excess liquidity in t = 1 (cash that is already available in t = 1
but is only needed in t = 2 to renance the repayment to patient depositors) banks
will oer any excess cash holdings in the interbank market at a riskless interest rate
i  0.
We assume that the initial liquidity holding (l0) are publicly observable and
veriable and thus contractible in t = 0. This assumption can essentially be viewed
as reecting regulatory liquidity requirements.18 However, the investment portfolio
xj, the deposit contract that banks oer their respective regional depositors and the
realization of regional and sectoral liquidity shocks are not veriable and thus not
contractible.
Thus the interbank market is a Bayesian game with the following stages: In t = 0
1) banks mutually sign a contract about their liquidity holdings, 2) individually
design a deposit contract that they oer households in their region and 3) collect
deposits and invest them in a portfolio of technology S and R in their region. Then
in t = 1 liquidity shocks materialize and dependent on their private liquidity shock
banks oer or demand liquidity in the interbank market against repayment in t = 2.
Taking the interbank market into account overall timing of our model is now
given as follows:
18Note also that we take this assumption to abstract from the usual underinvestment in liquidity
known from Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994). It is easy to
see that if banks could not verify each other's initial liquidity holding also in this setting banks
would underinvest in liquidity and free ride on the liquidity provision of their counterparty. As our
focus is to show that contagion also occurs if the interbank market is most ecient we abstract
from these market ineciencies. Fecht and Gr uner (2006) show that unsecured interbank deposits
are a way to eliminate this underinvestment problem.
28t=0: Banks commit to hold a certain fraction of their funds in liquidity.
Based on this commitment banks form expectations about t = 1 excess liquidity.
Banks oer fd1;d2g.
Households invest in deposits at local bank.
Banks invest in liquidity and in technologies S and R.
t=1: Households learn about private investment opportunity.
Regional and sectoral cash-ow shocks materialize.
Banks might borrow/lend IB from/to other banks.
Households observe liquidity available to their bank.
If bank has sucient funds to pay impatient HH d1 and patient HH d2,
then only impatient depositors withdraw and bank repays.
If bank has insucient funds to repay d1 and d2,
then depositors run and bank is liquidated and
liquidation proceeds repaid on rst come rst served basis.
t=2: Cash ow from late projects realized.
Banks repay/receive IB to/from other banks.
Banks pay d2 on deposits not yet withdrawn from households.
It is easy to see that the cross-border risk-sharing together with a fully specialized
portfolio, as derived in the previous subsection, can be achieved in an equilibrium of
this Bayesian game. To prove this assume rst that banks oer the optimal deposit
contract dI and agree to hold lI
0 liquid reserves. Furthermore assume that both banks
are fully specialized in their respective most ecient technology. In that case if bank
A (B) suers from a liquidity shortage{either due to a sectoral shock to technology











RB=2) in the t = 1 interbank market and can promise to repay
this amount at t = 2. If bank A (B) has excess liquidity because the technology S











RB=2). And banks will be willing to oer their entire excess liquidity
in the market as long as they receive the same amount back in t = 2 since their
alternative would be to store the excess liquidity. Thus given that banks are fully
29specialized the interbank market is a self revealing mechanism and ensures that
banks can sustain sectoral liquidity shocks.
The questions remains whether banks have an incentive to fully specialize or
not. Assume that bank A is less than fully specialized and holds a fraction xA > 0
in technology R, while bank B is fully specialized. It is easy to see that bank
A cannot repay a deposit contract dI if technology S is hit by a liquidity shock





(1   xA)SA   dI=2 in the interbank






is insucient to repay dI to the impatient depositors since RA < SA. Similarly, if
technology S is early and R late, the cash ow available in t = 2 is lower than under
full specialization and insucient to repay the patient depositors dI. Thus a bank
that is less than fully specialized can only oer a lower deposit contract than dI.
Hence, given the described interbank market banks always have an incentive to self
reveal their regional liquidity shocks (oer excess liquidity in the interbank market),
will fully specialize and will oer the second best deposit contract.
Intuitively, with an interbank market the diversication of liquidity risks is de-
coupled from banks' investment decisions. Since bank A only invests in technology
S and bank B only in technology R while sectoral cash-ow risks are diversied with
the respective interbank payments, banks in this case also oer the same deposit
contract as the social planner does. Since dI > d
D and lI
0 > lD
0 both banks therefore
also provide depositors with a higher expected repayment than autarkic diversied
banks.
However, it is easy to see that banks following this strategy rely on the liquidity
provision through the interbank market in case the technology that they are spe-
cialized in generates returns not before t = 2. If, for instance, bank A does not
receive IB funds in the interbank market in t = 1 when technology S is delayed it
has insucient funds available to repay dI to the impatient depositors. Since banks,
in contrast to the social planner, cannot suspend convertibility, a run on bank A
30is unavoidable and the bank is liquidated.19 Consequently, with a specialization in
lending banks expose themselves to a liquidity risk in the interbank market. This
generates the risk of spill-overs of regional liquidity shocks and cross-border con-
tagion. If region B is hit by a regional shock and all investments in that region
repay late while also technology S is delayed in region A, bank A will collapse
simply because it relies on a liquidity inow from the interbank market due to its
specialization.
These ndings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Financial integration through an interbank market enables banks to
specialize (xA = 0; xB = 1) without being destabilized by sectoral shocks. However,
specialization brings about the risk of contagion.
In the instances of nancial contagion that occurs with probability 2f banks
have insucient liquidity in t = 1 to repay d1 to impatient depositors. Both banks
will be liquidated and can only repay on average the per capital liquidity holding l0.
Thus depositors' expected utility under integration and specialization is given by
EU
I = 2f (qX + (1   q))l
I
0 + (2e + 2f)(qX + (1   q))dI: (16)
Note that because banks cannot suspend convertibility an inecient liquidation
of both banks is unavoidable in case of an aggregate liquidity shortage. Thus an
integrated interbank market cannot implement the constraint ecient allocation
that a social planner would achieve. Consequently, the utility that an integrated
interbank market and fully specialized banks can provide is lower than the welfare
that a social planner achieves because consumption is lower in case of aggregate
liquidity shortages.
19For a detailed explanation of this assumption see footnote 14.
315 Stability and welfare implications of integration
Both the stability and welfare implications of nancial integration through an inter-
bank market depend on the optimal bank behavior under autarky. We now analyze
all three cases from the previous section.
5.1 Autarkic banks with an undiversied portfolio
Consider rst the case in which autarkic banks hold an undiversied portfolio and
specialize in the most productive technology in their respective region at the risk of
being illiquid if this technology generates a return only with a delay. In this case a
bank fails with probability e+3f while the probability for each bank to fail under an
integrated interbank market is only 2f. Thus nancial stability is strictly increasing
through nancial integration in this case, while the probability of a joint banking
failure in both regions remains unchanged. The welfare implications of nancial
integration are ambiguous in this case. The optimal deposit contract of bank A
is given by d
U = SA and expected utility of depositors is given by EUU. Banks





(6q   2)f   2qe
(e + f)(2q   1)
:=   S > SA: (18)
Intuitively, while an undiversied bank under autarky is more likely to fail and thus
implies higher liquidation costs, such a bank does not need to hold any liquidity
to repay some of the impatient depositors. It will only honor the deposit contract
in the state in which all returns from technology S are realized in t = 1. Thus,
compared to integrated and specialized banks an autarkic undiversied bank saves
on the opportunity costs of holding liquidity. These costs decline as the fraction of
impatient households approaches 1=2. Consequently, for a q suciently close to 1=2
(18) always holds. The following proposition summarizes our ndings on the case
of autarkic banks with an undiversied portfolio.
32Proposition 4 Banks choose to specialize under autarky and prefer integration to
autarky with specialization if SA >  S, SA > ^ S, and SA <   S simultaneously hold.
In this case nancial integration reduces the probability of an individual bank failure
from e + 3f to 2f, while the probability of a joint failure of banks in both regions
remains unchanged at 2f.
Note that all three conditions and the condition that SA > RA > 1 can be made
compatible by an appropriate choice of parameters if q is suciently close to 1=2.
The reason is that the two lower bounds for SA in (15) are nite for q = 1=2.
5.2 Autarkic banks with a safe portfolio
Next, consider the case in which autarkic banks optimally follow a safe strategy and
hold sucient liquidity to serve the deposit contract even in case of a delay of both
technologies in their respective region due to a regional shock. Banks would in this






(1 + q)e + 2(2   q + q2)f
(1   q)e + 2(1   2q + q2)f
:= S < SA: (20)
However, one can show that condition (20) cannot be satised simultaneously
with SA < ^ S, which would ensure that EUS > EUR, and SA < S, which is required
to have EUS > EUD (see appendix). In other words, whenever banks nd it
optimal under autarky to hold sucient liquidity buers to sustain even regional
shocks, they will not integrate over an interbank market to share liquidity risks.
Intuitively, if opportunity costs of holding sucient liquidity buers are low enough
and the expected costs from liquiditation due to a regional shock are high enough
to keep banks from entering liquidity risks under autarky they will also refrain from
assuming liquidity risks when an integrated interbank market becomes available.
Access to a cross regional interbank market will not induce banks to reduce their
33liquidity buers, insure liquidity risks in the interbank market and become exposed
to liquidity shocks and contagion. Thus we have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Banks that hold sucient liquidity buers to sustain any liquidity
shock under autarky will never use a cross-border interbank market to reallocate
liquidity, because SA < ^ S, SA > S, and SA < S never simultaneously hold.
Proof. See appendix.
5.3 Autarkic banks with a diversied portfolio
Finally, consider the case in which banks hold a portfolio that diversies only sectoral
liquidity shocks under autarky. Given that nancial integration and specialization
brings about the risk of contagion it depends on the expected costs of contagion
relative to the gains from specialization whether banks prefer an integrated interbank




which can be rewritten as
2fl
I
0 + (2e + 2f)dI > 2fl
D














it is obvious that this always holds since
e + f >  (2q   1)f:
As the probability f of regional shocks is the same in both regions in our set-up
the expected welfare losses due to contagion are always overcompensated. With
an integrated interbank market each banks' exposure to its own regional shock is
reduced by f: Bank A, for instance, will be able to sustain a regional shock in region
A as long as technology R produces early in region B. Thus an integrated interbank
market enables banks to sustain some (but not all) liquidity shocks in their home
region, which a diversied autarkic bank could not sustain. Consequently, while
34contagion increases the probability of a joint banking crisis in both regions by f this
is completely oset by a reduction in the exposure to regional shocks in the home
region. Therefore, the probability of default of a bank is unaected by nancial
integration, while the expected repayments on deposits strictly increase.
Proposition 6 Banks which optimally invest in diversied loan portfolios under
autarky ( S > SA and S < SA) always prefer to pool liquidity risk in an integrated
interbank market and specialize in their lending portfolios. Since regional shocks
occur with the same probability f the default probability of each bank remains un-
changed, while nancial contagion increases the probability of joint banking crisis in
both regions from 0 to 2f.
In sum, the analysis in this section shows that availability of a cross-border inter-
bank market may reduce the default probability of one individual bank while it may
increase the probability of contagion and joint banking crises in both region. If an
integrated interbank market allows banks that already run a fully specialized port-
folio to pool their liquidity risks, this strictly increases nancial resilience. However,
the probability of a joint failure of banks in both regions remains unchanged. For
banks that hold a diversied asset portfolio under autarky an integrated interbank
market along with portfolio specialization does not aect individual banks' default
probability. In this case the increase in systemic risk is exactly oset by reduced
exposure to domestic shocks. Banks that hold sucient liquidity to overcome any
shock will not use a cross-border interbank market to reallocate liquidity. Thus the
availability of a cross-border interbank market has no stability implications in that
case.
Welfare implications can summarized as follows. Since banks will maximize
depositors' expected utility by not using an integrated interbank market to share
liquidity risks if it becomes available, nancial integration does not increase welfare.
Banks that do not hold liquidity buers but are fully specialized under autarky are
enabled to share liquidity risks across borders which may enhance welfare. For banks
35that only reap the benets from specialization if they can diversify liquidity shocks in
an integrated interbank market the availability of a cross-regional interbank market
clearly increases welfare. Since banks that hold sucient liquidity to overcome any
shock will note share risks in an integrated interbank market, the availability of such
a market has no welfare implication in this case.
6 Conclusion
When assessing the benets from nancial integration it has to be taken into account
that the greater scope for diversication through nancial integration may foster spe-
cialization which in turn increases the need for diversication. Thus, sticking to the
status quo of cross-country correlations of banks' liquidity does not allow to assess
the costs and benets from nancial integration. It underestimates the benets but
it also undervalues the risk of nancial contagion. This may have important empir-
ical implications. Approaches like Imbs and Mauro (2007) and Fecht, Gr uner, and
Hartmann (2007) that try to assess the benets from nancial integration based on
the given cross-country correlation of shocks could therefore lead to biased conclu-
sions in this regard. Empirical estimates of the benets of nancial globalization
should take the endogenous impact on the correlation structure into account.
Regarding the nancial stability implications of nancial integration our analysis
shows that integration weakly reduces the probability of individual banking crises,
while at the same time it may increase the risk of contagion and thus the probability
of widespread banking failures. In particular if the improved ability to pool liquidity
risks in an integrated interbank market induces banks to specialize in their lending
they become more dependent on interbank market liquidity provision and systemic
risk strictly rises.
In terms of policy implications, the greater contagion risk still puts pressure on
policy makers to adjust supervisory approaches and structures to the geographical
36scope of banking activities.20 While supervisory structures should develop to take
greater account of cross-border risks our analysis also suggests that nancial integra-
tion should not be resisted on stability grounds, at least not in industrial countries
with relatively well-functioning interbank markets and more limited contract en-
forcement problems. In fact, greater specialization in lending to the most protable
sectors through better bank risk sharing enhances overall welfare even though the
risk of cross border nancial contagion rises.
Obviously, our analysis does not take other negative externalities into account
that can be associated with banking crises. It is easy to see that in our model
particularly externalities that grow with the breadth of banking crises could bring
about situations in which banks decide to integrate through an interbank market
and specialize in their lending portfolio while this is not welfare enhancing. However,
including this into our formal analysis we leave for further research.
Our analysis could in principle also be applied to a single country with dierent
regions and dierent absolute advantages in production. However, there are reasons
why we believe that our model is better suited to address the role of cross border
interbank markets. First, in our model the only nancial link between regions is
the interbank market. In particular, there is no bank lending from one region to
another. In practice, informational problems are likely to be more pronounced
in cross border than in interregional retail business. Moreover, due to a unied
regulatory framework, it is much easier for banks to directly invest in another region
of the same country than to invest internationally. As a consequence even in a multi-
country region with a common currency and therefore as highly integrated as the
euro area, cross-border retail lending and deposit taking by banks is only a small
fraction of cross-border interbank lending and borrowing (see e.g. Baele et al., 2004,
and ECB, 2011). Hence, the role that an interbank market plays in permitting
ecient specialization should be much smaller at the national level than in the case
20See DellArricia and Marquez (2006) for a theoretical analysis of the relationship between
nancial integration and supervisory structures.
37of international nancial integration. Second, at the national level, a central bank
can easily cope with banking crises that are driven by pure liquidity shocks like those
emphasized in our model. The central bank can easily provide additional liquidity to
the banking sector to overcome those shocks. In an international context, any such
intervention requires some explicit or implicit coordination among central banks.
Therefore, the trade-o between ecient specialization and contagion should be
more important in an international context. In the national context, even without
an integrated interbank market, specialization may obtain when regions can rely on
central bank intervention. Similarly, contagion eects that arise due to integration
would not be as important because the central bank can easily intervene in case of
an aggregate liquidity shortage. Third, given the closer similarities of regions within
a country, the benets from integration and specialization should be smaller in the
case of interregional integration.
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43Appendix
Deriving  S : A diversied bank is preferable over an undiversied banks if
(2e + 4qf)d

D > (e + f)SA
inserting the deposit contract d
D this can be simplied to
2e + 4qf
e + f















e(1 + q) + (5q   1)f
(e + f)

(2q   1) +
(1 q)
RA
 =  S > SA:
Proof of the existence of an RA such that  S > RA > 1:
e(1 + q) + (5q   1)f
(e + f)





, e(1 + q) + (5q   1)f > (e + f)((2q   1)RA + 1   q)
, 2qe + (6q   2)f > (e + f)(2q   1)RA
,
2qe + (6q   2)f
(2q   1)(e + f)
=:  R > RA:
The upper bound on  R exceeds 1 if
2qe + (6q   2)f > (2q   1)(e + f)
, (4q   1)f + e > 0
, 4qf + e > f:
44Deriving S : A diversied bank is preferable over a safe bank if
(2e + 4qf)d
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> [(e + 2f)(2q   1)   q (e + 2qf)]SA






> [(e + 2f)(2q   1)   q (e + 2qf)]SA
,  2f(1   q)
2   (e + 2f)(1   q)
SA
RA
> [(e + 2f)(2q   1)   q (e + 2qf)]SA
, 2f(1   q)
2 + (e + 2f)(1   q)
SA
RA
< [q (e + 2qf)   (e + 2f)(2q   1)]SA
,
2f(1   q)2
[q (e + 2qf)   (e + 2f)(2q   1)]   (e + 2f)
(1 q)
RA





(2e + 4fq)dI > (2e + 4f)dS:
, (2e + 4fq)
SA
2(1   q) + (2q   1)SA
> (2e + 4f)
SA
(1   q) + qSA
:
, (e + 2fq)[(1   q) + qSA] > (e + 2f)[2(1   q) + (2q   1)SA]:
, (e + 2fq)(1   q) + (e + 2fq)qSA > 2(e + 2f)(1   q) + (e + 2f)(2q   1)SA:
45, [(e + 2fq)q   (e + 2f)(2q   1)]SA > [2(e + 2f)   (e + 2fq)](1   q)
,
2(e + 2f)   (e + 2fq)(1   q)
(e + 2fq)q   (e + 2f)(2q   1)
:= S < SA
,
(1 + q)e + 2(2   q + q2)f
(1   q)e + 2(1   2q + q2)f
:= S < SA
Proof of proposition 5: In order to prove that SA < ^ S, SA > S, and SA < S
cannot simultaniously hold, t is sucient to prove that SA < ^ S and SA > S cannot
simultaneously hold. We have
2e + 4f




= ^ S > SA
(1 + q)e + 2(2   q + q2)f
(1   q)e + 2(1   2q + q2)f
= S < SA:
Note that for q = 1=2 we have ^ S = S:
^ S (q = 1=2) =










































2 q   (e + f)(e(1 + q) + f (3 + q))




2 q   (e + f)(eq + e + 3f + fq)

















(e   2(1   q)f)

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
+ (e + 2(2   q)f)[(1 + q)e + 2(2   q + q2)f]
[(1   q)e + 2(1   2q + q2)f]
2 > 0
always holds because
(e   2(1   q)f)
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1   2q + q
2
> 0:
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